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suggestions. THE DEFAULT RISK OF HIGH-YIELD BONDS 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the default behavior of original issue rated non-convertible 
high-yield bonds.  The hazard model simultaneously estimates the impact of bond age, firm-
and issue-specific characteristics, and changing economic conditions.  The specification used 
models the impact of the time since issuance semi-parametrically, corrects for unobserved 
heterogeneity and allows for the possibility that outstanding bonds may default in the future. 
Our findings, based on a sample of 579 individual high-yield bonds issued between 1977 and 
1989, suggest that, after controlling for annual changes in economic conditions, default rates 
increase with age.  Bond characteristics at the time of issuance also impact the default 
behavior:  BB rated bonds tend to  have significantly lower default rates compared to CCC 
rated bonds; bonds with higher coupon rates have a significantly higher default rates.  In 
addition, high-yield bonds issued prior to 1980 experienced significantly lower default rates. 
J.E.L.  Classifications:  G 19, G33, C41 I.  Introduction 
During the late 1980s, the market for high-yielding, low-rated corporate bonds, or 
"junk bonds," grew rapidly to  about 25% of all public domestic corporate issues outstanding 
by the end of 1993  [Moody's (1994)].  Given the increase in  the new issue volume of high-
yield corporate debt, and the high default rates in  1990 and  1991,  numerous concerns have 
been expressed by investors and policymakers regarding the default risk within this market. 
This study investigates empirically the determinants of defaults of high-yield bonds. 
As the market for high-yield corporate bonds matures, one issue of concern is  whether 
default risk changes as bonds age.  Many studies note that the probability of default for newly 
issued high-yield bonds is  initially low and then dramatically increases over the first two to 
four years after issuance. l  Low default rates immediately subsequent to  issuance suggest 
companies avoid issuing bonds with high initial default risk.  However, it is not clear that 
high-yield bonds will become more or less likely to  default once they pass this critical point. 
A bond's survival for the first few years after issuance may provide positive information 
regarding the issuer's ability to  manage its debt burden.  Alternatively, a bond that remains 
outstanding may reflect that· the creditworthiness of the issuer has  not improved sufficiently to 
call the bond and refinance at a lower rate. 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between default risk and bond age is 
mixed.  Altman (1989) and Asquith, Mullins and Wolff (1989), for example, found that the 
longer bonds have been outstanding, the lower the default probability.  However, Blume, 
Keirn and Patel (1991) proposed that this aging relationship may  in fact reflect changing 
economic conditions.  We address this concern by examining simultaneously the effect of 
aging and the impact of macroeconomic changes. 
In addition to  macroeconomic conditions and age, default rates may also be related to issue-specific attributes.  Characteristics which have been shown to be associated with default 
of high-yield bonds include:  the bond's rating at issuance, the coupon rate, the seniority, the 
year of issuance, the bond's maturity and whether the bond was underwritten by Drexel [see 
Altman (1992); Asquith et al.  (1989); Cheung, Bencivenga and Fabozzi (1992); Cotter and 
Peck (1995); Platt (1993); and Rosengren (1993)]. 
Much of this existing research (a)  used aggregate analyses, and/or (b) studied the 
potential influence of a particular bond characteristic in  isolation.2  In contrast, this paper 
employs individual-level survival analysis to investigate simultaneously the impact of age, 
changing economic conditions and issue-specific characteristics on the default rate.  We use a 
flexible hazard model specification where the impact of the time since issuance is modeled 
semi-parametrically, thereby imposing no distribution on the estimation of the aging effect. 
Furthermore, the chosen specification takes unobserved heterogeneity into account; we show 
how a failure to do so affects the estimates.  By taking into account both observed (through 
the explanatory variables) and unobserved heterogeneity, the hazard model used in .this study 
allows us to separate spurious from real time dependence. 
The model is  applied to a data set of 579 individual high-yield non-convertible 
corporate bonds issued between 1977 and 1989.  We find that, after controlling for annual 
changes in economic conditions, default rates increase with bond age.  Bonds rated BB at 
issuance have significantly lower default rates than CCC bonds.  When the rating, age and 
economic conditions are taken into account, other issue characteristics such as  seniority, 
initial maturity, whether the bond was underwritten by Drexel, and whether the bond was 
issued as  part of a leveraged buyout (LBO) do not appear to have a significant influence. 
The coupon rate, and the year of issuance, however, are significantly related to the default 
probability. 
2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the empirical 
literature on the determinants of bond defaults and distinguishes our study from prior work. 
The flexible hazard specification is  developed in Section III.  Section IV describes the sample 
and explanatory variables.  Empirical results are presented in  Section V.  Finally, Section VI 
summarizes the findings. 
II.  Determinants of High-Yield Bond Defaults 
Aging Effect:  Altman (1989) and Asquith, et al.  (1989) examined the high-yield 
corporate bond market and presented evidence that bonds outstanding for longer periods of 
time are more likely to  default, which is  referred to as  an  "aging effect".  Support for the 
aging effect has often been based on an actuarial approach:  aggregate default rates for bonds 
that have been outstanding for equal periods of time (i.e., all issued in  the same cohort 
year),3  were calculated and shown to increase over time. 
Macroeconomic Conditions:  Blume, Keirn and Patel (1991) questioned the presence 
of an aging effect by  observing that in  some years there are more defaults than in others.4 
For example, default rates were high across all  age groups in  1985,  1987,  1990 and 1991, and 
were low across all  age groups in 1988.  Blume et al.  (1991) thus proposed that a large 
portion of the defaults previously attributed to bond age may be more appropriately attributed 
to  overall economic conditions.  Indeed, Blume and Keirn (1991) found that the aging effect 
disappeared in their sample when default rates were adjusted for overall economic conditions. 
Macroeconomic conditions may affect the default probability in  a number of ways. 
First, as  argued in Denis and Denis (1995), recessions such as  1990-1991  are likely to reduce 
cash flows, thereby increasing the likelihood that issuers cannot meet their obligations. 
Second, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argued that asset markets are less  liquid during an 
3 economic downturn, which may deter firms from selling assets in order to fund their debt 
obligations.  The approach taken in this study allows us to distinguish between the aging 
effect and the impact of macroeconomic changes. 
Another problem when making inferences about the presence of an aging effect from 
aggregated data is that the observed pattern may result from spurious aggregation effects. 
Lancaster (1990), Morrison and Schmittlein (1980) and Schmittlein and Morrison (1983) 
demonstrated that aggregation may result in downward biased estimates of the time 
dependence.  This bias can be illustrated by considering a situation where none of the bonds 
experience any aging effect, but where some bonds have a high default rate, while others are 
characterized by an extremely low default rate.  The high-default-rate bonds will default early 
on, leaving a higher proportion of bonds with a very low default probability.  This will cause 
the observed number of defaults to become smaller, which would suggest a negative 
correlation between default and age, even without any individual bond's default probability 
changing with age.  The hazard model used in this study allows us to separate spurious from 
real time dependence by taking into account both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Rating:  Using the actuarial approach as  described above, i.e., where the aggregate 
default rate is calculated for specific cohort groups, prior studies have found evidence that the 
default rate of high-yield bonds is related to the rating provided by Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's at issuance.  For example, Altman (1992) and Asquith et al.  (1989) found that B rated 
issues tended to exhibit higher cumulative default rates than BB  rated issues.  Similarly, 
Altman and Kishore (1995) found that CCC rated issues experienced higher cumulative 
default rates compared to BB  and B;  Hradsky and Long (1989) reported a decline in the 
average time from issuance to default from higher- to  lower-rated bonds.  However, it is 
unlikely that ratings capture all relevant individual-level factors which may affect the 
4 likelihood of default. 
Coupon Rate:  In addition to the bond's rating, the coupon rate may provide 
information about the bond's default risk.  A company that is  committed to paying a higher 
fixed interest rate is  likely to have a higher probability of defaulting on the payments, all 
other things equal.  Lehman and Fridson (1995), for example, found that even after 
normalizing for ratings, high coupon issues are more likely to  default than low coupon issues. 
Seniority:  Cheung, Bencivenga and Fabozzi (1992) found that seniority is  related to 
bond default.  Alternatively, Fridson and Garman (1995) argued that while subordinated 
bonds are expected to have lower payoffs in  the default state compared to  senior bonds with 
the same rating, the former are not expected to  have a higher default probability. 
Underwriter (Drexel):  Prior studies have found that a smaller percentage of bonds 
underwritten by Drexel Burnham Lambert experienced default compared to bonds with other 
underwriters [Altman (1989);  Asquith et al.  (1989); Platt (1993)].  This underwriter effect 
has been attributed to Drexel's dominance, experience and expertise in the high-yield market 
and attempts by other underwriters to penetrate the market by underwriting issues of less 
creditworthy firms. 
LBO-Related:  Whether the issue was used to finance a leveraged buyout may also 
contribute to  the default risk.  LBO-related issues, for example, may be more risky than other 
newly-issued high-yield debt because LBO firms  tend to be more highly leveraged.  Wigmore 
(1990) provided a simple model of LBO returns which suggests that for most issuers, debt 
reduction needs to  be combined with growth in earnings if long-term debt obligations are to 
be met.  He noted that while most LBOs create cash by selling assets and cutting capital 
expenditures in the early years, this may hinder the sustained growth needed for the next 10 
to  15  years if the issuer is  to be able to  repay debt. 
5 Maturity Structure:  The maturity structure of the debt may contribute to its default 
risk.  Cotter and Peck (1995) hypothesized that shorter maturity debt is associated with a 
greater likelihood of default.  They argued that issuing shorter maturity debt increases the 
debt burden in early periods which, in  tum, increases the probability of default.  Cotter and 
Peck examined a sample of LBOs, and provided evidence that as  the average maturity (at 
issuance) of the debt increased, the likelihood of subsequent default decreased. 
Issuance Year:  Wigmore (1990) provided evidence of a decline in credit quality for 
high-yield bonds issued in  the  1980's.  He observed that the decline in credit quality was 
only partially reflected by increases in the percentage of bonds issued with the lowest credit 
ratings.  He showed that credit quality (based on financial ratios) within rating categories 
declined after 1985. 
In most studies, each of the above factors, including the aging effect, has been 
considered in isolation.  An exception is  Altman (1989), where the cohorts consisted of bonds 
issued in a given year and in a given rating.  Clearly, such an  actuarial procedure becomes 
cumbersome when dealing with multiple predictors, and the number of observations in each 
cell will reduce quickly.  Rosengren (1993) adopted a logit model to estimate the probability 
of default as a function of bond-specific features.  Consistent with default rates increasing 
with bond age, Rosengren found that the probability of default is related to  the year of 
issuance, with earlier years having significantly higher default rates than later years. 
Drawbacks of this approach, as  illustrated in Gupta (1991), however, are that (1) bonds which 
are still outstanding at the end of the observation period are classified as  non-defaulting even 
though they may default in  the future, (2) for those bonds which have defaulted, no 
distinction is made between early and late defaults, which results in  a loss of information, and 
6 (3) it is difficult to correct for unobserved heterogeneity and to  incorporate time-varying 
explanatory variables in logit models.s 
Our work extends the empirical literature on the individual-level default risk of high-
yield bonds in  several ways.  First, we investigate the impact of aging, changing economic 
conditions and issue-specific characteristics simultaneously.  Second, we use a flexible hazard 
model specification that (a)  models the impact of aging semi-parametrically, which allows for 
a monotonic or non-monotonic aging effect, (b)  includes both fixed and time-varying 
variables, and (c)  accounts for unobserved heterogeneity.  Lastly, our observation period ends 
in December 1994, which is  a longer observation period than prior work. 
III.  Method of Analysis 
Let the random variable T denote the time between issuance and default, with 
associated probability density function J(t) and cumulative density function F(t).  Then, 
h(t)  J(t)  (1) 
1  - F(t) 
is the hazard, i.e., the rate at which bonds default during period t given that they have not 
done so in the previous t-l periods since issuance.  The survival function S(t)= I-F(t) denotes 
the probability that default does not occur for at least t periods.  To account for the discrete 
nature of our data, monthly grouping intervals [tk-I' tk), k=I,2, ... ,m+l, to=O  and tm+l=oo  are 
defined, and default in interval [tk-I'  tk)  is recorded as  tk,  which is  the number of months since 
issuance. 
As indicated before, the default rate of bonds may depend not only on the time 
7 elapsed since issuance, but also on the bond's characteristics and on general economic 
conditions.  To model the hazard rate as  a function of explanatory variables, we use the Cox 
(1972) formulation and let 
h(t)  = ho  ePX(t)  ,  (2) 
where X(t) is a vector of explanatory variables which may be fixed (e.g., coupon rate) or 
time-varying (e.g., economic conditions),  ~ is  a vector of parameters, and ho is the default rate 
of the base group.  The base group consists of bonds for which all explanatory variables equal 
zero.  A positive  ~-coefficient implies that a positive value of the associated variable 
augments the default rate.  Specifically, when the j-th variable changes by one unit, the 
hazard changes by  [exp(~j)-l)] *  100 percent. 
To quantify the impact of the time since issuance, one can either assume a particular 
distribution for the time dependence of default rates, or introduce this time dependence in a 
semi-parametric fashion.  Given the absence of a theoretical justification for choosing a 
particular distribution, the latter approach is preferred, especially since the choice of an 
incorrect parametric distribution has been shown to result in inconsistent parameter estimates. 
The semi-parametric approach that we adopt, on the other hand, results in consistent estimates 
even when the true form of the underlying baseline hazard is unknown, as  shown in Meyer 
(1986,1990).  The semi-parametric approach involves adding a vector of time-varying dummy 
variables, D(t), to the model:6 
h (t)  = ho  eP XU)  eC DU)  ,  (3) 
8 where c is  a vector of coefficients.  A separate variable is  used for each period; for example, 
D(3) takes on the values (0 0  1 0 0 ... ).7  The quantity ho  in equation (3) then gives the 
default rate of the base group in the first post-issuance period.  Positive (negative) c-
coefficients indicate a higher (lower) default rate compared to the first period. 
The semi-parametric approach makes no distributional assumptions regarding the 
nature of the time dependence..  The only assumption made is that within a grouping interval, 
the hazard remains constant.  The aging effect is thus measured as  a piecewise approximation 
of an  underlying, possibly very complex, continuous time-dependence pattern.  If the default 
rate is  constant over time (i.e., there is no aging effect), all  the coefficients of the time-
varying dummy variables are equal to zero and t follows an exponential distribution. 
Monotonically increasing c-coefficients imply that the default probability increases as the 
bond ages.  However, our model is flexible enough to  also allow for a non-monotonic 
dependence on time. 
Several patterns of time dependence may be possible for high-yield bonds.  The 
studies cited in Section II suggest a positive time dependence.  Still, one could also argue that 
a bond's age provides information about the issuer's ability to manage its debt burden.  Put 
differently, a bond remaining outstanding for a large number of periods may indicate that the 
issuer has been able to meet its debt payments for a long time.  The (conditional) likelihood 
of default may therefore start to decrease from a certain point onwards, in which case a non-
monotonic pattern would be observed. 
To estimate the parameters ho,  c and  ~, maximum likelihood estimation is used.  In 
what follows,  we first derive an expression for the likelihood function in terms of the survival 
function, after which we use a general relationship between a distribution's hazard and 
9 survival functions to express the likelihood function in terms of ho,  c and  ~. 
The contribution of a given bond to the likelihood function depends on  whether the 
bond is classified as  a completed or censored observation.  In practice, one can distinguish 
between five types of non-convertible bonds:  (1) bonds that defaulted, (2)  bonds that were 
still outstanding at the end of the observation period, (3) bonds that were called, (4)  bonds 
that matured, and (5)  bonds that were exchanged.  The first category can be  interpreted as 
completed observations, while the other four categories are referred to  as  censored. 
A bond X that has defaulted is  a completed observation: we know the time tx that has 
elapsed since issuance before the bond defaulted.  Because of the discrete nature of the data 
(i.e., we are working with monthly. grouping intervals), the contribution of a defaulted bond to 
the likelihood function is  given by the difference in the survival functions SCtx-I)-SCtx). 
Bonds that are still outstanding by the end of the observation period are censored 
observations: these bonds mayor may not default in the future.  The contribution to  the 
likelihood function of such a bond Y with an observed duration of ty is  given by the survival 
function S(ty-I): we know the bond has not defaulted within the first ty-I months.s  Bonds 
that have been called are also classified as  censored; since these bonds can no longer default 
after being called, their hazard becomes zero at that point (or,  alternatively, their survival 
function remains constant after the call date).  Hence, the contribution to the likelihood 
function of a bond C that has been called is given by the survival function evaluated at the 
number of months priorto the call or exchange date S(te-I).  Using similar reasoning, a bond 
M that has matured is also censored since this bond can no longer default after reaching 
maturity; its contribution to the likelihood function is  therefore given by  SCtM)'  where M is  the 
number of months in the life of the bond.  For our purposes, bonds involved in non-distressed 
10 exchanges are also treated as  censored observations.  However, as  in Platt (1993), we classify 
distressed exchanges as  defaults.  Based on the above arguments, the contribution of the i-th 
bond to the likelihood function is  given by the following expression: 
(4) 
where ti is the number of observed periods (months) until default or censoring, and di  is an 
indicator variable equal to one for censored observations and zero for completed 
observations.9 
The expression for the hazard function given in equation (3) can be substituted into 
equation (4) through the following general relationship [Lancaster (1990); Ross (1980)]: 
tj 
Si(ti)  = e - 6j(tj)  where 8i(t)  = f  hi(u) du  . 
o 
(5) 
If we assume that the time-varying variables remain constant within each period but that they 
can change from period to period, SiCt)  can be written as: 
1  2  tj 
8j(ti)  = f  hj(l)dU  + f  hj(2)du  +  +  f h;Ctj)du 
o  1  tl-l 
(6) 
After appropriate substitutions, it can be shown that the log-likelihood function for N bonds 
11 IS: 
N 
LL(tilho)  = L  {(l-di )  In[e-hoBj(tj-1)  - e-hOBj(tj)]  - di ho  Bi(ti-I)}.  (7) 
i=l 
While the explanatory variables may capture some of the cross-sectional variation, part 
of the heterogeneity may not be quantifiable.  For example, it would be difficult to measure 
the investment opportunity set of the issuer.  Yet changes in this opportunity set would affect 
the ability of the issuer to  meet its debt commitment.  The presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity leads to a downward bias in the c-estimates (which would translate into an 
underestimation of the aging effect), and to  inconsistent estimates of the  ~-coefficients 
[Heckman and Singer (l984a,b)].  Unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled by  allowing ho 
to vary across bonds according to  a certain distribution.  In other words, we allow for bonds 
with the same observable explanatory variables to have a different mean default probability. 
Mathematically, this can be accomplished by weighing the conditional likelihood by the 
relative occurrence of its ho-value.  As such, one obtains the unconditional likelihood 
contribution of the i-th bond, which no longer depends on a specific value of ho: 
LiCti )  = f LiCti I  ho) g(ho)  dho ' 
o 
where g(ho) is called the unobservable mixing distribution.  A commonly used mixing 
distribution is the gamma distribution [see e.g. Meyer (1990)].  The gamma mixing 
distribution is often used because of its flexibility (it can take on both inverted U and J 
shapes) and because it gives a closed-form solution for the log-likelihood function: lO 
12 
(8) N 
LL  .E  In  { (1 +d,)  [  a  y 
i=1  •  Bj (ti-l) +  a 
(9) 
_[  a  y}. 
B/tj  -1)  +  (I-d) e  13  Xi(ti)  +  C  Di(t;)  +  a 
The mean of the gamma distribution, ria,  is  then used as  an estimate of the hazard of the base 
group in the first period, and the  ~ and c- parameters are subsequently interpreted relative to 
this mean in  the same way as  they were interpreted relative to  ho. 
IV.  Data 
The data set consists of 1185 original-issue high-yield non-convertible corporate bonds 
identified by Securities Data Corporation as  publicly issued in the United States between 
January 1977 and December 1989.  We limit the sample to  the 703 bonds for which the 
issuer is included in the Compustat files;  i.e., those bonds for which post-issuance information 
is more likely to be available.  The rating, seniority, and underwriter of each bond are 
identified for 579 bonds with issuance information in the Standard & Poor' s Monthly Bond 
Guides.  Using the same source, we identify defaults, calls, exchanges; and bonds that were 
still outstanding as of December 1994. 11  Default is  defined as  the assignment of a D rating 
by S&P for a missed coupon payment.  Our definition of default is  similar to that of other 
studies, including Asquith et al.  (1989), Blume and Keirn (1991), and Rosengren (1993).  For 
those bonds where the post-issuance history was not apparent from this source, the Moody's 
Bond Record, the Wall Street Journal and LexislNexis were consulted.  For these bonds, 
default is  defined as  a report of a missed coupon, or bankruptcy filing.  The sample includes 
three distressed and three non-distressed exchanges. 
13 Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on the issue-specific explanatory variables. 
Table 1 describes the sample per year of issuance.  For our sample, the number of high-yield 
bonds issued and the average size increased steadily through the  1980s.  These observations 
suggest that our sample is  a representative sample of new issuances of high-yield bonds in 
1977-1989 [see e.g., Altman (1992), Drexel Burnham Lambert (1989)].  As  of December 
1994, 27.6% of all issues had defaulted.  The proportion of defaults is  higher than that of 
prior studies, presumably because of the longer observation period we use here.  The mean 
annual coupon rate varied from a low of 10.47% in  1977 to a high of 13.74% in  1980. 
Table 1 also reports the number of bonds issued in each rating category by year of 
issuance. 12  The table illustrates the decline in credit quality of new-issue junk bonds: there 
is  a dramatic increase in the percentage of high-yield new issuances rated in the lower rating 
categories in the late  1980s. 
Table 2 provides the number of bonds issued, defaulted, and mean time to default, for 
each initial rating, each seniority, Drexel underwritten bonds and LBO-related bonds.  The 
majority of the bonds were rated B at issuance, with only a small proportion of bonds rated 
CCc.  Overall, Band CCC rated bonds experienced a larger default percentage (29.0% and 
29.1%, respectively) compared to BB rated bonds (19%).  Of defaulting bonds, the mean time 
to default was 4.54 years.  Bonds initially rated CCC had the shortest mean time to default 
(4.10 years).  For censored bonds, the mean time until censored was 6.85 years. 
The majority of bonds issued were subordinated or senior subordinated.  The number 
of bonds defaulting in our sample is  greatest for subordinated debt (29.4%).  Of bonds which 
defaulted, senior subordinated had the shortest mean time to default (4.00 years). 
The proportion of bonds underwritten by Drexel is  similar to that in other studies; of 
the 579 bonds included in our sample, 230 are underwritten by Drexel.  While the proportion 
14 of bonds underwritten by Drexel which default (30.4%) is  slightly higher than that of the 
sample (27.6%), the mean time to default is  the same for Drexel and the  overall sample (4.54 
years). 
The bonds in  our sample that were associated with LBOs were identified by Securities 
Data Corporation.  LexislNexis was used to  verify this information.  Sixty of the bonds in the 
sample were associated with LBOs.  Fourteen of the sixty LBO-related bonds, or 23.3%, 
defaulted, which is  lower than the default rate of 27.6% for the remainder of the sample and 
the 27% default rate for management buyouts reported in  Kaplan and Stein (1993). 
As  a measure of overall economic conditions throughout the  1977-1994 period, the 
change in the Gross National Product (GNP) is  included as  a time-varying explanatory 
variable.  For each month t  subsequent to a bond's issuance, the annual percentage change in 
GNP is calculated using GNP aggregated over the preceding 12 months, i.e. GNPt_1 through 
GNPt_12,  relative to GNPt_13  through GNPt_24•  The probability of default should be negatively 
related to changes in GNP.  As  a check for the robustness of the estimators, we also use a 
rolling window of the 12-month percentage change in the Business Cycle Index (BCI) current 
indicator as a measure of economic conditions.  GNP and BCI data are obtained from the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
V.  Empirical Results 
This Section reports the results of estimating the log-likelihood function in equation 
(9).  The vector of explanatory variables Xj(tj)  comprises the time-varying change in GNP, 
three 0-1  indicator variables to denote the rating (BB, B, and Not Rated), two 0-1  indicator 
variables to  denote seniority (senior subordinated and senior), the coupon rate, a 0-1  indicator 
variable to  identify bonds underwritten by Drexel, a 0-1  indicator variable that is equal to  1 
15 for LBO-related bonds and zero otherwise, two 0-1  indicator variables to denote the years to 
maturity at issuance (between  10 and 15  years; greater than 15  years), and two 0-1  indicator 
variables to denote the issuance period (between 1980 and 1984;  1985 and subsequent).  Issue 
size is  included as  a control variable. 
The base group consists of high-yield bonds with the following properties:  (1) 
subordinated, (2) rated CCC at issuance, (3) not underwritten by Drexel, (4)  no coupon, (5) 
not LBO-related, (6) with initial maturity less than 10 years, and (7) issued prior to  1980. 
For both models, the base group assumes no change in GNP.  Empirical results are presented 
in Table 3.  Model I in Table 3 accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in the data, while 
model II does not.  All estimates, along with the t-statistics, should be interpreted relative to 
the base group.  The expected sign of the coefficients, based on the discussion in Section II, 
is denoted next to the variable name in the first column of Table 3. 
Aging Effect 
When applying a piece-wise approximation to  an underlying continuous baseline 
hazard, one must determine the number and location of the discrete shifts.  Working with 
monthly data with a maximum of 213 months, it clearly does not make sense to  allow for a 
different c-parameter in every month.  Instead, we chose to allow for a discrete shift every 24 
months, with a last shift after 144 monthsY  Put differently, our model assumes constant 
monthly default rates between two shifts (e.g.,  C2S=C26= ...  =C48) and the c-coefficients indicate a 
proportional shift in the default rate relative to  the first 24 months after issuance.  Based on 
the c-estimates of model I, the baseline hazard is plotted in Figure  1. 
There is  strong evidence of an aging effect in the default behavior of the high-yield 
bonds.  Every bi-annual jump, except for the last one, is  positive and significant at the  1  % 
16 level, indicating that the monthly default rate increases significantly after the first two years. 
The monthly default rate for each of the first 24 months is estimated at 0.1 % for the base 
group.  The monthly default rate jumps to 0.46%  [ = 0.001 *exp(1.526)] after 24 months and 
0.75% [ = 0.001 *exp(2.015)] after 48  months.  For the other bonds, the hazard is  proportional 
to this graph, and is  obtained by mUltiplying the baseline hazard with  exp[~X], where X is 
their vector of explanatory variables.  For example, consider a bond with the following 
characteristics: rated CCC at issuance, junior, 13% coupon, $110 million issuance size, 
underwritten by Drexel, not LBO-related, initial maturity less than  10 years, issued after 1984. 
When the time-varying percentage change in  GNP is zero, the monthly default rate in the first 
24 months is  1.4% [= 0.001*exp{I1.492(0.13)-0.051(1.1O)+0.289+0.880} = 
0.001 *exp{2.6069}] and 6.4%  [ = exp{ 1.526}*0.014] in the second 24 months.  After two 
years, the monthly default rate is  10.5% [ = exp{2.015}*0.014].  For the same type of bond, 
suppose now that the time-varying percentage change in GNP is 0.04%.  In this case, the 
monthly default rates fall to 0.8% [= 0.001*exp{2.6069-0.143(4)}], 3.7% and 6%, 
respectively. 
,The default rate continues to  increase until the end of year 12, after which it seems to 
decline.  However, a likelihood ratio test reveals thatc145  ... 213  is  not significantly different from 
Cl2l  ... 144  (X2(l)=0.5227),  thereby suggesting that the default rate levels off, rather than drops, 
after 12 years. 14 
Figure 1 also presents the baseline hazard of model II, which is the same as  model I 
except that model II does not include the gamma mixing distribution; i.e., model II does not 
take unobserved heterogeneity into account.  Figure 1 clearly illustrates the downward bias on 
the estimated aging effect when not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity:  the baseline 
hazard for model II lies below the baseline hazard for model 1.  Put differently, if one does 
17 not explicitly correct for the fact that not all relevant factors can be included into the model, 
the aging effect will be underestimated.  Note also that the effects of the covariates are larger 
and more significant in model I than in model II.  Parameterizing unobserved heterogeneity 
therefore seems to  have eliminated some of the attenuating effects of the omitted variables 
[see also Vanhuele et al.  (1995) for a more detailed discussion]. 
Economic Conditions 
It is  important to note that we find a significant aging effect in both models even 
though we explicitly account for changing economic conditions.  The coefficient estimate for 
the growth in GNP is  negative and significant at the 1  % level.  This is consistent with 
significantly lower default rates when GNP increases.  In other words, the aging effect 
reported in prior studies is not solely a result of changing economic conditions.  Instead, our 
results suggest that both the number of months since issuance and the state of the economy 
have a significant impact on the default rate of high-yield bonds. 
Model III in Table 3 provides estimates of the model when using the BCI as  an 
alternative measure of the state of the economy.  Again, the coefficient estimate is negative 
and significant.  The similarity of the c-coefficients to those estimated when using GNP 
(model I) suggests that the aging effect is  robust to different operationalizations of economic 
conditions. 
Issue-Specific Characteristics 
Model I in Table 3 also includes issue-specific variables.  After controlling for the 
aging effect and changing economic conditions, BB  rated bonds have a significantly lower 
default rate than CCC rated bonds.  Specifically, the default rate for BB  bonds is  75.8%  [ = 
18 100*(exp(-1.419)-1)] lower compared to CCC bonds.  The default rates for B rated and non-
rated bonds, however, are not significantly different than for CCC bonds. 15  Uniike prior 
studies [Altman (1989), Asquith et al.  (1989) and Platt (1993)]  we find that issues 
underwritten by Drexel do not have a significantly lower default rate. 
Unlike Cheung et al.  (1992), we find that the seniority of the debt does not have a 
significant impact on the default rate. 16  Similar to  Rosengren (1993), issue size is not 
significant, while, as expected, the coupon rate has a positive and significant influence on the 
default probability.  17  Our results further indicate that LBO-related high-yield bonds are not 
significantly more likely to default than non-LBO related junk bonds. 
We find that high-yield bonds issued in later periods (1980-1984 and subsequent to 
1984) are more likely to default than those issued in the base period (1977-1979) at the 10% 
level.  The relative magnitude of the corresponding parameter estimates (0.741  and 0.888) 
seems to provide some support for a further decline in bond issuance quality in the mid 
1980' s;  however, the significance is not statistically different (X\I)=0.1438). 
Contrary to Cotter and Peck (1995), we find that bonds with the longest maturity do 
not have a significantly lower default rate than bonds with initial maturity less than ten years. 
This may be explained in part by the presence of some correlation between maturity and 
issuance year.  As seen in Table 1, the maturity of debt at issuance declined over the sample 
period, which suggests a negative correlation between issuance period and maturity.  The 
correlation between maturity and issuance year is -0.51  in  our sample.  While still below the 
conventional cut-off rule of 0.8  [Judge et al.  (1988, p.868)], this may have affected to  some 
extent the corresponding parameter estimates.  We elaborate on this issue in Table 4,  which 
provides estimates of models for subsets of the variables. 
Model IV in Table 4 excludes the issuance period variables.  For this model there is  a 
19 negative and significant coefficient for the indicator variable for the longest maturity (greater 
than  15  years).  Model V excludes the two maturity indicator variables.  For model V,  the 
coefficients of the two issuance period indicator variables are positive and significant, which 
is consistent with prior evidence of a decline in quality of bond issuances over the period. 
Note we still do not find a statistically significant difference between the coefficient for the 
1980-1984 issuance period and the post-1984 issuance period (X\l)=0.459). 
The differing estimates of the maturity and issuance period coefficients between model 
I and models IV and V illustrate the difficulty associated with making statistical inferences in 
the presence of correlation between explanatory variables.  One must question whether 
issuance period or maturity is the driving force behind prior research estimates.  Indeed, a 
likelihood ratio test (X2(4)  = 6.567) indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that all four 
maturity and issuance period coefficients are equal to  zero. 
VI.  Conclusions 
This empirical study investigates the individual-level default rate of high-yield 
corporate bonds.  Previous studies of high-yield bond defaults provided evidence of an  aging 
effect:  the longer bonds have been outstanding, the greater the default probability.  However 
Blume, Keirn and Patel (1991) asserted that this aging relationship reflects changing economic 
conditions.  This study of bond defaults discriminates between the aging effect and the impact 
of macroeconomic changes. 
We adopt a hazard model where the impact of aging is modeled semi-parametrically, 
which is flexible enough to capture monotonic or non-monotonic aging effects.  Our 
specification includes both fixed and time-varying variables, which allows us to estimate the 
impact of aging, changing economic conditions and issue-specific characteristics on the 
20 default rate simultaneously.  The specification also takes into account the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
The model is  applied to a sample of 579 high-yield non-convertible bonds issued 
between 1977 and 1989 and followed through December 1994.  We find a significant aging 
effect even though we explicitly account for changing economic conditions.  Our findings 
suggest that default rates exhibit a positive aging effect.  In  addition, we find that the rating at 
issuance, the size of the coupon and the issuance period are significantly related to the default 
rate.  However, the issue's seniority, size, maturity, whether the issue was underwritten by 
Drexel and whether the issue was LBO-related do not appear to have a significant influence 
on the likelihood of default. 
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24 TABLE 1 - EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  BY  YEAR OF  ISSUANCE 
Issue  Issues  Average  Mean  Mean  Rated  Rated  Rated  Not Rated  Defaults 
Year  Size  Coupon  Time to  BB  B  CCC  (NR) 
($Mil.)  Maturity 
(in years) 
77  19  30.158  10.47  17.21  10  8  0  3 
52.6%  42.1%  5.3%  0.0%  15.8% 
78  33  27.197  11.54  18.64  5  27  0  11 
15.2%  81.8%  3.0%  0.0%  33.3% 
79  27  26.611  12.34  18.07  3  21  2  10 
11.1%  77.8%  3.7%  7.4%  37.0% 
80  28  32.475  13.74  18.29  5  20  2  7 
17.9%  71.4%  3.6%  7.1%  25.0% 
81  13  65.769  13.67  17.00  3  9  0  7 
23.1%  69.2%  0.0%  7.7%  53.8% 
82  26  61.538  13.39  14.31  6  18  0  2  9 
23.1%  69.2%  0.0%  7.7%  34.6% 
83  53  95.292  11.98  15.68  16  25  4  8  23 
30.2%  47.2%  7.5%  15.1%  43.4% 
84  52  68.644  13.61  12.56  6  27  4  15  13 
11.6%  51.9%  7.7%  28.8%  25.0% 
85  72  90.972  12.98  11.54  10  42  4  16  15 
13.9%  58.3%  5.6%  22.2%  20.8% 
86  90  132.644  11.69  11.84  12  57  11  10  22 
13.3%  63.3%  12.2%  11.1%  24.4% 
87  76  182.086  12.75  11.13  14  47  14  22 
18.4%  61.8%  18.3%  1.3%  28.9% 
88  49  202.806  13.27  10.63  5  31  11  2  10 
10.2%  63.3%  22.4%  4.1%  20.4% 
89  41  202.049  13.29  11.63  5  30  3  3  8 
12.2%  73.2%  7.3%  7.3%  19.5% 
All  579  111.781  12.64  13.40  100  362  55  62  160 
17.3%  62.5%  9.5%  10.7%  27.6% 
Notes:  The sample consists of 579 high-yield securities issued between 1977 and  1989, for which data is  available 
from Compustat and the Standard and Poor's Monthly Bond Guides.  The amount issued, number of issues, mean issue 
amount, mean coupon, mean number of years from issuance to  maturity, are from  Securities Data Corporation.  Bond status, 
as  of December 31,  1994, is  determined using the Standard and Poor's Monthly Bond Guides, Moody's Bond Record, the 
Wall Street Journal,  and LexislNexis wire service reports. 
The percentages of the bonds rated BB, B, CCC and Not Rated in a given year sum to  100%. 
25 TABLE 2 - ORIGINAL RATING, SENIORITY,  UNDERWRITER (DREXEL) AND  PURPOSE (LBO-RELATED) 
Issues 
Original Rating 
BB  100 
B  362 
CCC  55 
Not rated  62 
Seniority 
Mortgage  18 
Senior  103 
Senior  227 
Subordinated 
Subordinated  231 
Underwritten by Drexel  230 
Leveraged Buyout  60 




















































Notes: Sources of data are described in  the notes for Table 1.  The bond seniority and underwriter are from the 
Standard and Poor's Monthly Bond Guides.  Bonds associated with LBOs were identified by Securities Data Corporation. 
26 TABLE 3 - PARAMETER ESTIMATES  OF THE HAZARD MODEL 
Variable  I  II  III 
With gamma  Without  With BCI 
mixing  gamma mixing  with gamma 
distribution  distribution  mixing 
distribution 
Baseline Hazard 
ria  (I,In) or ~) (II) 
(1-24 months)  0.001  0.001  0.001 
c25 .. 48  1.526"  l.145"  1.514" 
c49 .. 72  2.015"  l.121"  1.983" 
c73 .. 96  2.883"  1.354"  2.826" 
c97 .. 120  3.192"  l.178"  3.122" 
c 121.. 144  3.341"  1.041 c  3.253" 
c145 .. 213  2.517c  0.071  2.426" 
Economic Conditions 
Change in GNP (I,II)  (-)  -0.143a  -0.091h 
Change in BCI (III)  (-)  -0.126" 
Issue-sQecific Variables 
BB rating  (-)  -1.419b  -0.515"  -1.390b 
B rating  (-)  -0.398  -0.054  -0.382 
Not rated  (+)  -0.304  -0.185  -0.297 
Senior debt  (-)  0.209  0.180  0.202 
Senior subord. debt  (-)  -0.028  -0.029  -0.034 
Coupon rate  (+)  11.492b  6.124c  11.458b 
Issue size  -0.051  -0.039  -0.052 
Drexel  (-)  0.289  0.199  0.293c 
LBO  (+)  0.118  -0.056  0.114 
Maturity: 
10 to 15  years  (-)  -0.280  -0.214  -0.279 
Greater than 15  years  (-)  -0.516  -0.359  -0.513 
Issuance Period: 
1980 - 1984  (+)  0.741h  0.295  0.701h 
After 1984  (+)  0.880b  0.308  0.821h 
Log-likelihood  -1024.824  -1027.509  -1025.201 
Notes:  a(b.c)  indicates significant at the 1  % (5%,10%) level for a two-tailed test (the baseline hazard) or a one-tailed 
test (the other explanatory variables), based on asymptotic t-statistics. 
Expected coefficient signs appear between parentheses next to  the variable names. 
27 TABLE 4 - PARAMETER ESTIMATES  OF THE HAZARD MODEL WITH THE GAMMA MIXING DISTRIBUTION 
EXCLUDING ISSUANCE PERIOD AND  MATURITY VARIABLES 
I  IV  V 
All  Excluding  Excluding 
explanatory  issuance  maturity 
variables  period  variables 
variables 
Baseline Hazard 
ria (1-24 months)  0.001  0.001  0.000 
c25 .. .48  1.526"  1.476"  1.530" 
c49 ... 72  2.01S"  1.90S"  2.024" 
c73 ... 96  2.883"  2.669"  2.896" 
c97 .. .l20  3.192"  2.887"  3.210" 
c12l...144  3.341 "  2.978"  3.363" 
c145 ... 213  2.517c  2.126  2.543c 
Economic Conditions 
Change in GNP  (-)  -0.143"  -0.128"  -0.143" 
Issue-sJ2ecific Variables 
BB rating  (-)  -1.419b  -1.345b  -1.436' 
B rating  (-)  -0.398  -0.384  -0.393 
Not rated  (+)  -0.304  -0.269  -0.240 
Senior debt  (-)  0.209  0.024  0.264 
Senior subord. debt  (-)  0.028  0.014  -0.006 
Coupon rate  (+)  11.492b  13.118"  9.746b 
Issue size  -0.051  -0.002  -0.060 
Drexel  (-)  0.289  0.310  0.331c 
LBO  (+)  0.118  0.150  0.131 
Maturity: 
10 to  15  years  (-)  -0.280  -0.344 
Greater than  15  years  (-)  -0.516  -0.772b 
Issuance Period 
1980 - 1984  (+)  0.741b  0.888' 
After 1984  (+)  0.880b  1.122" 
Log-likelihood  -1024.824  -1026.312  -1025.362 
Notes:  ,(b.c)  indicates significant at the  1%  (5%,10%) level for a two-tailed test (the baseline hazard) or a one-tailed 
test (the other explanatory variables), based on asymptotic t-statistics., based on asymptotic t-statistics. 
Expected coefficient signs appear between parentheses next to  the variable names. 
28 Figure 1 
Time Dependence of the Conditional Default Probability of High-Yield Bonds 
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1.  Studies which provide evidence of an increase in default rates during the first few  years 
since issuance include Altman (1989), Altman and Kishore(1995), Asquith, Mullins and Wolff 
(1989), Cheung, Bencivenga and Fabozzi (1992), and Platt (1993). 
2.  One exception is  Rosengren (1993), who used a logit model.  Section II compares logit 
models with our method of analysis. 
3.  In the actuarial approach, default rates are measured as the amount of defaults relative to 
the population of bonds in the same cohort that could still default (i.e., that were still at risk). 
4.  Blume and Keirn (1991) and Cheung, Bencivenga and Fabozzi (1992) also documented 
the  high  number  of defaults  in  some  years  relative  to  others.  J6nsson  and  Fridson  (1995) 
provided evidence that aggregate default rates are related to changes in economic conditions, as 
measured by the percentage change in Gross National Product. 
5.  Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is conceptually similar to the omitted variable problem, 
and may lead to biased parameter estimates. 
6.  Examples of applications of this semi-parametric approach include Vanhuele, Dekimpe, 
Sharma and Morrison (1995) and Han and Hausman (1990). 
7.  To avoid identification problems when simultaneously estimating eland ho,  no separate 
indicator variable is  added for the first period. 
8.  Note that we  assume  the  censoring occurs  at  the  beginning  of the  grouping  interval. 
Clearly, some such assumption is  needed given the discrete nature of our data. 
30 9.  It should be noted that the contribution of a bond that is still outstanding, has been called, 
or was involved in a non-distressed exchange is given by SUi-I), while the contribution of a bond 
that has matured is SUJ  This difference in contributions, due to the grouping intervals, does not 
necessitate a special term in the likelihood function if the input matrix is  altered by adding 1 to 
the life span of every bond that has matured. 
10.  See Vanhuele et al.  (1995) for a derivation. 
11.  We validated the default and call dates for corresponding bonds in the Blume and Keirn 
(1991) Appendix III for those bonds which defaulted or were called during their analysis period. 
12.  The  aggregate  ratings  include bonds  rated  with  a  + or  -;  e.g.,  the  rating  category B 
includes bonds rated B+ and B- at issuance. 
13.  No  other jumps are  allowed after  144 months so  as  to ensure that the c-estimates  are 
based on a large enough group of bonds. 
14.  The aging effect is  not likely to  be affected by crisis at maturity:  only one out of 579 
bonds in our sample defaulted at maturity. 
15.  Since the ratings categories are broad rather than detailed categories, adjusting the ratings 
for seniority as  in Fridson and Garman (1995) does not change the results. 
16.  Because of the small number of secured issues, mortgage issues are included in the senior 
issues classification. 
17.  All bonds in our sample have fixed coupons.  Estimating the model with the coupon rate 
relative to  the average coupon rate in the issuance year did not materially change the results. 
31 